Showing posts with label Construction Accidents. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Construction Accidents. Show all posts

Saturday, January 2, 2010

LONG ISLAND CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT ATTORNEY

Injured construction workers, in addition to workers compensation, often have a right to bring a lawsuit against the property owner and the general contractor.  New York's worksite safety laws make the owner and general contractor responsible for


* Injuries Where A Worker Falls From a Height

* Injuries Caused By Falling Objects; and

* Injuries Caused By Industrial Code Violations

I have extensive experience representing injured construction workers.  I have brought these cases to trial, and have argued notable appeals, including Zheng v. Cohen, 52 A.D.3d 801, 861 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dept. 2008), where the court found that the question of whether a property is a one- or two-family dwelling could be sent to the jury; and Stawski v. Pasternack, 54 A.D.3d 619, 864 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dept. 2008), where the court found that falling object liability applies even where the object was not actually in the process of being hoisted or secured at the time it fell.  

Tuesday, December 22, 2009

Personal Injury Attorney - Construction Accident Liability Clarified By Court of Appeals In Runner v. New York Stock Exchange

The Court of Appeals recently issued key a Labor Law 240(1) decision clarifying the meaning of the statute.  In Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, the plaintiff injured his hands when he was asked to lower a large reel down a staircase using a make-shift hoist.  Rather than loading the reel onto an actual hoist or pulley, a rope was tied around it, which was strung over a wooden rail, and the plaintiff was asked to hold one end of the rope to act as a counterweight.  The matter went to trial in a Federal District Court, went to Second Circuit, and the Second Circuit certified the legal issue to the New York State Court of Appeals.

Defendants argued that, for Labor Law 240(1) to be applicable, "gravity must operate directly upon either the plaintiff or upon an object falling." The Court of Appeals responded, however, that ""the single decisive question is whether plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential."   Labor Law 240(1) was applicable because "a pulley or hoist should have been used."

The defense bar constantly tries to limit the scope of this stutute.  It is a broad statute, covering gravity-related risks, and requires owners and contractors to provide safety devices to guard against that risk  The Court of Appeals did not express any new law, or new interpretion, but, rather merely once again rejected an attempt to create a bright-line rule where none was necessary.  Although the "de minimus height differential" argument is sometimes used as a manner of expressing that a particular circumstance did not present a gravity-related risk, at no point have New York's Courts expressed any sort of minimum height differential.  In fact, "falling object" cases have been upheld where the fall was, essentially, horizontal.

Over at the New York Civil Law Blog,  Matt Lerner points out that the Court focused on the nature of the object being hoisted or secured. The nature of the object is not a new consideration -- notably, in cases such as Outar v. City of New York, the Court has previously commented on objects being the type of object that requires securing -- but it is an under-appreciated factor that the Court makes plain is very relevant to the Labor Law 240(1) inquiry.

Eric Turkewitz at the New York Personal Injury Law Blog notes that this decision is part of a trend away from defense oriented decisions. A lot of it has to do with which cases the Court of Appeals chooses to hear, but there has been a trend.  Looking at the leading Court of Appeals decisions over the last five years, six of eight -- Runner, Quattrocchi(2008), Sanatass (2008), Broggy (2005), Outar (2005), and Stejskal (2004) -- have been Plaintiff friendly; in the five years prior to that, however, only two of five were found in the plaintiff's favor.    

Monday, November 9, 2009

Construction Injury Trial On The One- Or Two- Family Dwelling Issue

I just finished a trial in Queens. It was a construction accident case, and the issue was whether a property consisted of a one- or two-family dwelling.

Under New York's construction site safety laws, specifically Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6), owners and general contractors are jointly responsible for certain types of construction accidents. This rule does not apply, however, to owners of one- or two-family dwellings who do not direct or control the work.

In this case, my client had fallen through an unprotected floor opening and was severely injured. The general contractor did not have proper insurance, and had gone out of business (leaving no assets to go after). The only viable defendants were the property owners, a retired couple.

The owners had torn down a one-family ranch and were building two two-story houses on the lot. They had not yet received a certificate of occupancy, but the plans and permits listed the structures as two one-family houses. Each house was initially supposed to have five bedrooms, but the plans were later changed (after the complaint was served) so that each house had three bedrooms. One was supposed to have two full and two half baths; the other was supposed to have one full and three half baths.

In those houses, the owners claimed that they would reside in one; their oldest son (42 years old, who paid approximately half of the construction costs) would become the owner of other and live there with his wife and two kids; and the two other adult sons would rent rooms from either their parents or older brother. There was no set "rent," but the brothers (in their 30's, both recently laid off) would pay what they could afford. My client was injured in the house that the owners claimed they intended to occupy.

We suspected that the owners either planned to sell the property for a profit, or have additional tenants, but they flatly denied it during both their depositions and at trial.

As part of the project, the parents established a home owners association creating various easements over the lots after they are formally divided. The home-owners association by-laws contemplated tenants on the property, sale of the property, and possibly building a third house or buying another adjascent house in the future.

This case raised an unsettled issue of New York law: was this purported family compound a one- or two-family dwelling?

There are several cases from the New York Court Of Appeals addressing the one- or two-family dwelling exception. Under these cases, the issue depends on the "site and purpose of the work." Stejskal v Simons; Khela v. Neiger). Where the construction project involves multiple structures with "arguably unifying features," the intended occupancy of the structures can be combined. (Mandelos v. Karavasidis). The one- or two-family dwelling exception is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the burden of proof.  (Van Amerogen v Donnini).

In addition to intended occupancy, there was also the issue of commercial use. The homeowner's exemption applies where the project is "undertaken solely in connection with... residential use, even if the construction "may have fortuitously affected another area of the property that was used for commercial activities." (Cannon v. Putnam). The exception does not apply, however, if the one- or two-family dwelling is used "solely and exclusively" for a commercial purpose (such as preparation for rental or sale). A property can be consider "solely and exclusively" commercial even if it is also the owner's primary residence. (Lombardi v. Stout; Van Amerogen). The Court of Appeals has not announced a rule for situations where the distinction between commercial and residential use is a matter of degree.

Although it was a thorny issue, the trial seemed to be going in my favor. The property owners were hostile during cross-examination, and were caught making several misrepresentations. For example, the husband had claimed during his deposition that all three of his sons were single and lived at home; at trial we heard that the oldest son had been married for ten years and lived on hid own. The wife authenticated blueprints on direct, laying a well-rehearsed foundation; on cross, however, she admitted that she had only seen them once several years ago and had no idea what she was looking at. She also equivocated about whether the basement was divided into seperate rooms, and where the younger sons were going to live.

As the trial continued, the defendants moved off from their nuisance-value offer. After significant discussion (and my firm's managing partner coming in to close the deal), we agreed to a high-low settlement: agreeing not to go after the defendants' individual property if we won in excess of the insurance policy, and guaranteeing our client a not-insignificant amount if we lost. As part of the high-low, both sides waived their right to appeal.

Prior to closing arguments, both sides moved for a directed verdict. In addition to the Court of Appeals cases above and others, I relied on a recent case from the Third Department, Nudi v. Schmidt, which found that renting to an adult child can be considered a commercial purpose.  Defendants relied largely on Baez v. Cow Bay Construction, a 2003 Second Department case finding that the homeowner's exception applied where a family had torn down their old house, built two one-family homes for the family to live in, and put the properties in a corporate name but insisted that they intended to live there.

Before closing arguments, both sides moved for directed verdicts, and the court dismissed the case as a matter of law. We knew it was a possibility, but it was extremely disappointing. I felt we had a solid argument that: first, the anticipated occupants -- two couples and two grown men -- counted as more than two families; and, second, the occupants, although related, had a business arrangement that made the construction predominantly commercial.

Was the judge right?

RELATED POSTS


- Construction Accident Attorney[Violations Of The Industrial Code]
- Construction Accident Attorney [Falling Workers And Objects]
- One- Or Two- Family Dwelling Exception
- Out Of Possession Landlords Are Still Responsible For Construction Accidents
- Court Of Appeals Clarifies That Construction Safety Laws Apply To "Cleaning" Activities Even When Not Related To Construction

Saturday, August 29, 2009

Personal Injury - Construction Accident Attorney [Injuries From Violations Of The NYS Industrial Code]

Labor Law 241(6) reads:

All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places. The commissioner may make rules to carry into effect the provisions of this subdivision, and the owners and contractors and their agents for such work, except owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, shall comply therewith.
This law makes owners and general contractors responsible for ensuring that the New York State Industrial Code is not violated at their work sites, and allows injured construction workers to file a lawsuit to recover damages for pain and suffering if they suffer an injury caused by a violation of the Industrial Code.

Under Labor Law 241(6), the owner and general contractor can be held liable regardless of whether the owner or general contractor directed or controlled the work. Cunha v City of New York, N.Y.3d 504 (2009). Not every provision of the industrial code is specific enough to give rise to liability, however, and the worker's own negligence will be considered. Misicki v Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511 (2009). The owner or general contractor may also argue that the injuries were caused by something other than a violation of the industrial code, and there may be other parties (such as the equipment manufacturer) who are responsible. Pavlou v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 961 (2007).

The Industrial Code contains numerous detailed provisions regarding specific hazards common to construction sites.  Below is a list of some of the more common ones.

Tools and Equipment.
  • Hand tools must be kept in good repair, free from burs or cracks.
  • power-driven machines, such as saws and belts, must have proper guards to protect workers from cutting and tearing injuries to their hands and feet.  A common example of a violation of this rule is circular or bench saws where the safety guard has been broken or removed.  
  • Jacks, forklifts, and other lifting devices must be well maintained and properly rated for the load they are required to carry 
  • Safety goggles must be provided to workers exposed to risk of eye injury, and a hard hat or helmet must be provided to workers exposed to risks from falling or flying objects. 
Property:
  • Stairways must be safely constructed and have guard rails that meet particular specifications.
  • Proper lighting must be provided
  • Walls, concrete, and steel work must have shoring or bracing during construction or demolotion
  • Flooring must be stable and secure
Fire, Electricity, and Chemicals:
  • Electricity must be turned off or, it if cannot be turned off, proper protection must be taken.
  • Compressed gas containers, lines, and hoses must be properly stored and kept safe
  • Explosives must be handled with care, and in compliance with particular regulations
  • Proper protective clothing must be provided if workers are exposed to toxic or corrosive chemicals, and respirators must be provided to workers exposed to toxic fumes. 
Protection Against Gravity-Related Risks:
  • Workers exposed to a risk of falling must be provided with safety harnesses, lifelines, nets, scaffolding, roof brackets, and other safety devices where appropriate. 
  • Materials stored at a height must be properly secured to prevent falling;
  • Shafts must have proper guards and warnings.  
If you are looking for a construction accident lawyer, feel free to contact me. 
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Related Posts:

Sunday, April 26, 2009

Personal Injury - Construction Accident Attorney [Falling Workers And Objects]




Construction accident litigation was one of my one of my first niche practice areas as a lawyer.  I have handled numerous trials and appeals, and have published two articles on the topic.


New York State passed a series of laws in the nineteenth century, with the emergence of skyscrapers and other major construction projects, designed to ensure construction site safety. Those laws still protect workers today.

Under New York's construction safety laws, workers who are exposed to gravity related risks should always be provided with proper protective devices. New York's Labor Law 240 (1) specifically requires contractors and property owners to provide workers with “proper protection” against gravity related hazards, such as falling from a height or being struck by a falling object.

In pertinent part, the statute reads:



All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one and

two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the
work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting,
cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect,
or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor,
scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys,
braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed,
placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so
employed.
Statutes such as Labor Law 240(1) offer two major benefits for construction workers. First, they encourage work-site safety by motivating owners and general contractors (through awareness of responsbility and fear of liability) to strictly oversee the safety practices of their subcontractors.



Second, when workers are injured, these laws provide injured workers with an opportunity to hire a lawyer and obtain compensation for their injuries through a personal injury lawsuit. In general, workers who are injured on the job are entitled to Worker's Compensation, but the trade-off for Worker's Compensation is that injured workers cannot sue their employer for work-related injuries. By placing ultimate responsibility for worksite safety on the owners and general contractors, New York's laws provide injured workers with a responsible (and usually well insured) party other than their employer whom they may sue for damages in addition to Worker's Compensation.

Although the statute appears straight-forward (the relevant portion contains less-than 100 words), interpreting the precise language of Labor Law 240 is one of the most frequently and aggressively litigated issues in the New York Courts. Defenses include, for example, that owners of one- or two-family dwellings may be exempt from liability; the statute only protects certain enumerated activities, not routine maintenance; not every fall qualifies as a gravity-related risk; and an injured worker may not recover if they are entirely at fault for their own injuries.


Below is a list of the leading interpretive cases from the New York Court of Appeals, with links to each decision.

LEADING CASES


Strangio v Sevenson Envtl. Servs., Inc., 15 N.Y.3d 914, 913 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2010)(triable issue of fact as to whether defendant provided "proper protection.")


Belding v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 14 N.Y.3d 751, 898 N.Y.S.2d 539 (2010) (Applying bomb blast film to windows counts as a "significant alteration").  


Gallagher v New York Post, 14 N.Y.3d 83, 896 N.Y.S.2d 732 (2010)(summary judgment granted to plaintiff despite testimony from general contractor that safety harnesses were available, where there was no evidence that the injured worker knew where the harnesses were or had been instructed to use them).  


Holly v County of Chautauqua, 13 N.Y.3d 931, 895 N.Y.S.2d 308 (2010)(question of fact as to whether scaffolding provided "proper protection.")

Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, 13 N.Y.3d 599 (2009)(where plaintiff was required to hold one end of a rope, acting as a counterweight while an object was lowered, and was pulled up into the make-shift hoist, injuring his hands, Labor Law 240(1) was applicable because  "a pulley or hoist should have been used... the single decisive question is whether plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.")


Quattrocchi v F.J. Sciame Constr. Corp , 11 NY3d 757 (2008)(wooden planks that were used as a make-shift shelf above a door frame and fell, striking a worker, constituted the type of falling object risk that the statute protects against).

Sanatass v Consolidated Inv. Co., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 333 (2008) (the term "owner" includes an out of possession landlord)


Broggy v Rockefeller Group, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 675 (2007)(although it does not cover "routine household window washing," "cleaning" is its own category under the statute; it does not need to be connected with a construction site and applies equally to interior and exterior cleaning).

Robinson v. East Med. Ctr., LP, 6 N.Y.3d 550 (2006)(injured worker was entirely at fault for his own injuries where a ladder of the proper height was available to him, but he chose instead to stand on the top-cap of a short ladder).

Outar v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.3d 731 (2005)(a dolly that rolls off a ledge and strikes a worker is the type of falling object risk that the statute protects against).

Montgomery v. Federal Express Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 805 (2005)(Plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his own injuries where he chose to use an upside-down bucket rather than an available ladder).

Stejskal v Simons, 3 NY3d 628 (2004)(one- or two-family dwelling exception applies where the "purpose of the construction" was to convert a multi-family dwelling into a one family dwelling).

Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, Inc., 1 N.Y.3d 280 (2003). (If an injured worker was somewhat at fault for their own injuries, but not entirely at fault, they are nonetheless entitled to be fully compensated for those injuries. “Contributory negligence will not exonerate a defendant who has violated the statute and proximately caused a plaintiff's injury… Section 240 (1) is, therefore, an exception to CPLR 1411, which recognizes contributory negligence as a defense in personal injury actions.”)

Panek v County of Albany, 99 N.Y.2d. 452, 458 (2003)(Removing a large air conditioning units two weeks before a demolition project was not part of or ancillary to the demolition, but was a "significant alteration" which is also an enumerated activity under the statute).




Esposito v. N.Y. City Indus. Dev. Agency, 1 N.Y.3d 526, 526 (2003)(routine maintenance for normal "wear and tear" is not a significant alteration to which the statute applies).

Narducci v. Manhassett Bay, 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267 (2001)(a falling window pane that was unrelated to the construction is not a falling object risk that is protected by the statute).

Bond v. York Hunter Constr., Inc., 95 N.Y.2d. 883, 885 (2000)(slipping while climbing out of a construction vehicle is not an elevation related risk calling for a protective device).

Melo v. Consolidated Edison Co., 92 N.Y.2d. 909 (1998)(§ 240 has “historically been construed in the context of workers injured as a result of inadequate or missing safety equipment at elevated work sites ... in recognition of the exceptionally dangerous conditions posed by elevation differentials at work sites”)




Weininger v Hagedorn & Co., 91 N.Y.2d. 958, 960 (1998)(Running computer and telephone wires constitute a significant alteration, and there was a question of fact as to whether plaintiff, who fell while trying to forcibly yank a cable wire through a hole, was the sole proximate cause of his own injuries).

Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d., 457 (1998)(“Defining [the terms of labor law 240(1)] with precision… is a highly elusive goal”... installing a built-in wall clock is a significant alteration).

Brown v. Christopher St. Owners Corp., 87 N.Y.2d. 938 (1996)(“the ‘cleaning’ encompassed under the statute does not include the routine, household window washing… [but does include] the cleaning of all the windows of a large, nonresidential structure such as a school")




Khela v. Neiger, 85 N.Y.2d 333 (1995)(whether a property is a one- or two-family is determined by the site and purpose of the work being performed).

Mandelos v. Karavasidis, 86 N.Y.2d 767 (1995)(there was a question of fact for a jury as to whether two neighboring yet jointly owned two-family dwellings were entitled to the one- or two-family dwelling exception, both due to the occupancy and the fact that the construction may have enhanced commercial, rather than residential, usage)

Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 487, 491 (1995) (a wall that collapses after having been finished is not the type or risk protected against by the statute because Labor Law 240(1) applies to during the course of construction, not to gravity related risks from a completed structure).

Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d. 494 (1993)(back strain caused by repeatedly stretching is not a gravity-related risk).

Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514 (1991)(the risk of stepping in a bucket of oil is not a gravity-related risk and thus not protected against by the statute)

Van Amerogen v Donnini, 78 N.Y.2d 880, 880 (1991)( “The [one- or two-family dwelling] exception may be extended only so far as statutory language warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of statute's general provision rather than exception”).

OTHER RESOURCES


NYS Deptartment of Labor, New York State Industrial Code, "Protection in Construction, Demolition, and Excavation Operations."

Occupational Safety and Health Adminstration, OSHA

NYC Department of Buildings, Construction Safety

NYC Occupational Safety and Health Non-Profit, Homepage


New York State Trial Lawyer's Association, Labor Law 240(1) Myths


Tuesday, September 23, 2008

Personal Injury -- A Falling Cinder Block Is A Gravity Related Risk Under The Labor Law, And Does Not Need To Be In The Process Of Being Hoisted Or Secured

In Stawski v. Pasternack Popish & Reif, 2008 NY Slip Op 07036 (Sept. 23, 2008), the plaintiff was struck by a falling cinder block that had been temporarily removed from a column and then returned to an open cavity in the column without being appropriately secured. The original attorneys failed to file a notice of claim against the municipal owner of the construction site (when you are suing a municipality, you must give them notice of your intention to file a claim -- usually within 90 days of the occurance), and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed.

The plaintiff then sued his original attorneys for malpractice. The attorneys argued that the underlying case lacked merit because Labor Law 240(1), the theory upon which it was alleged the case should have been brought, only applied to objects that were in the process of being hoisted or secured.

The parties agreed to the underlying facts of the case, and moved and cross-moved for summary judgment. The Civil Court found that there was a question of fact as to whether Labor Law 240(1) applied, and that the case should go to the jury. The attorneys then appealed to the Appellate Term, which reversed and granted summary judgment, finding that there was no Labor Law 240(1) case.

Now, after granting leave to appeal, the First Department has revesed the Appellate Term's decision and, on remand, has ordered that summary judgment be granted in favor of the plaintiff.

You can learn more about Labor Law 240(1) here.   If you are looking for representation, feel free to contact me at Scott.Kreppein@gmail.com.

Tuesday, July 22, 2008

Personal Injury - Out-of-Possession Landlords May Still Be Responsible For Construction Accidents On Their Property

A hat-tip to Matt Lerner's Civil Law Blog, the Court of Appeals clarified a mildly unsettled Labor Law 240(1) issue recently, finding in Sanatass v Consolidated Inv. Co., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 333 (2008) that when the statute -- which requires that owners and contractors give workers "proper protection" against elevation related risks (both falling from scaffolds and ladders, or being struck by falling objects) -- says "owners," that includes out-of-possession landlords. The landlord can of course contract with the tenant for complete indemnification, i.e. that the tenant has to pay any judgment against the landlord, but the owner themselves is at least nominally on the hook.
You can learn more about Labor Law 240(1) here.  If you are looking for representation, feel free to contact me at Scott.Kreppein@gmail.com.  

Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Under Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6), The One- Or Two-Family Dwelling Exception Depends On the Site and Purpose Of The Work

Where a construction accident occurs during work on an owner-occupied one- or two-family dwelling, the property owner is exempt from liability under New York's Labor Law 240(1)(related to gravity related hazards) and Labor Law 241(6)(related to tools, equipment, and violations of he State Industrial Code).

In Zheng v. Cohen, 2008 NY Slip Op 5910 (2d Dept., June 24, 2008), a homeowner attempted to argue that they were entitled to the one- or two-family dwelling exception to New York Labor Law 240(1) -- which places an affirmative obligation on contractors and building owners to ensure that workers who are exposed to gravity-related hazards have proper protective equipment (such as ladders, hoists, scaffolding, etc.) but exempts owners of one- or two-family dwellings -- because they used the home as a one-family residence. The building, however, was legally a three-family dwelling, and the construction project during which the plaintiff was injured did not change the legal occupancy of the dwelling.

Defendants argument that the one- or two-family dwelling exception applied to three-family dwellings that are only occupied by a single family was based on Stejskal v Simons, 3 NY3d 628 (2004) and Khela v Neiger, 85 NY2d 333, 648 N.E.2d 1329 (1995) which had held that the purpose of a construction project is the determinitive factor in deciding whether a building is a one- or two-family dwelling (i.e., a three-family home being converted to a one-family home is entitled to the exemption). Stejskal had never before been interpreted, and it was an open question whether an owner's averments as to the actual use of the premises were sufficient to implicate the one- or two-family dwelling exception.

The lower court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Second Department affirmed, finding that the homeowners had failed to show that the sole purpose of the construction was the conversion of the building to a one- or two-family dwelling, and that the homeowners statements were insufficient to set forth a prima-facie showing that the building was not used as a three-family dwelling at any point after the construction.
  
You can learn more about Labor Law 240(1) here.  If you are looking for representation, feel free to contact me at Scott.Kreppein@gmail.com.

Friday, August 31, 2007

Personal Injury Attorney - "Cleaning" Injuries Under Labor Law 240(1)

In Broggy v Rockefeller Group, Inc., 2007 NYSlipOp 05775 (July 2, 2007), here, the New York Court of Appeals resolved some of the ambiguity over what type of "cleaning" is a protected activity under Labor Law 240(1), which places an affirmative duty on owners and contractors to protect workers engaged in certain high-risk occupations from gravity related hazards.
The Courts of Appeals had previously said that “the ‘cleaning’ encompassed under the statute does not include the routine, household window washing… [but does include] the cleaning of all the windows of a large, nonresidential structure such as a school,” Brown v. Christopher St. Owners Corp., 87 N.Y.2d. 938, 939 (1996), but the Departments of the Appellate Division then split over how this was to be applied: the First and Third Departments hdld that “Cleaning” refers to any commercial cleaning but not truly domestic cleaning, while the Second and Fourth Departments hold that “cleaning” refers only to professional window washing. Compare Chapman v. IBM, 253 A.D.2d. 123, 125 (3rd Dept., 1999)(cleaning interior light fixture of building a protected activity) and Fox v. Brozman-Archer Realty Servs., 266 A.D.2d. 97, 98 (1st dept., 1999) (maintenance worker protected when power-washing Plexiglas canopy at entrance of building) with Machado v. Triad III Assocs., 274 A.D.2d. 558 (2nd dept., 2000) and Noah v. IBC Acquisition Corp., 262 A.D.2d. 1037 (4th Dept 1999). See also Garcia v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98-CV-7259 (JG), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 621, 8-9 (E.D.N.Y, 2001) (agreeing with 1st and 3rd Departments).
In Broggy, 30 AD3d 204, 206-207 (1st Dept. 2007), the First Department attempted to narrow its previous holdings regarding "cleaning," and held that cleaning was only a protected activity if it is ancillary to construction, demolition or repair.
The Court of Appeals reversed this finding, however, and held that cleaning, as defined in Brown v. Christopher Street, is a protected activity regardless of whether it is ancillary to construction, demolition, or repair.
Although it disagreed on this point, the Court of Appeals nonetheless affirmed the decision to grant summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff in Broggy had failed to prove that his work necessarily entailed a gravity related risk. The Broggy plaintiff had been injured when he climbed on a desk to clean a window inside an office, but in opposing summary judgment the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that he had climbed on the desk due to a gravity related hazard that was necessarily incumbent upon his employment (either through the nature of the job or the direction of his employer), and the Broggy plaintiff failed to meet this burden. Had the desk not been in his way, the plaintiff could have cleaned the window while standing on the floor with his extendable squeegie, and thus the plaintiff had failed to prove that he had climbed on the desk because of the height of the window and could not rebut the defendant's argument that he had climbed on the desk merely to avoid the difficulty of either moving it or leaning over it.
You can learn more about Labor Law 240(1) here.  If you are seeking representation, feel free to contact me at Scott.Kreppein@gmail.com.